Mümtaz'er Türköne wrote: Street call

The operations, the resistance, and the developments in our region will ultimately yield results. Much will change. The stage is dust and smoke. It's impossible to tell today who will be left standing amidst the dust and dust when things calm down. However, we are rapidly approaching a critical juncture. Everyone is playing overtime.

The palace is running its game with an "all or nothing" mentality. The CHP is simply resisting. The truly devastating problems, however, are looming large outside this fight to the death.

There are three main axes that will, through mutual interaction, yield results and determine our direction. The first is the Peace Process under the shadow of Syria; the second is the Palace's war against the CHP; and the third is the post-Erdogan power struggle that escalated to death within the steel core of the Palace's power, which exploded with the Can Holding incident .

With the rotational momentum of these three main axes, Türkiye is heading towards an unknown direction.

The most fundamental area of ​​concern for international actors is the Peace Process. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is managing this axis by preserving the power-opposition rivalry in domestic politics, is now in control. If tensions escalate between the Syrian government and the SDF, and Turkey becomes actively involved in the conflict, then power will completely shift to the Palace. The Peace Process will be shelved again. If Kurdish politics loses control, violent social protests will escalate domestically. In this turmoil, vulnerable to provocations, the conditions for a transition to a state of emergency will mature. If a state of emergency is declared, democracy and the rule of law will be suspended indefinitely, without the need for judicial operations against the CHP.

News of clashes between the SDF and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SNA) coming from Syria bodes no good. Turkey is trying to neutralize the SDF by throwing all its weight behind Sharia. With Israel and the US standing by, Turkey cannot make Damascus the sole patron of Syria. Damascus's power is insufficient to prevent clashes. Israel is fueling tensions. Ankara's calculations, designed to protect Türkiye's interests, are clearly flawed. The Syrian Kurds should have become Türkiye's natural partner on the ground by now. The internal peace process hinged on this relationship. The fact that the ENKS, which opposes the PYD—that is, Kurds close to Barzani—are holding talks with Damascus under Turkish auspices is confusing.

Syria must certainly be the focus of NATO's trustee representative Hikmet Çetin's meeting with Bahçeli, and Feti Yıldız's subsequent response. There's pressure from the Palace on the Turkish Armed Forces for an armed intervention. If Turkey goes to war with the Kurds in Syria on behalf of Damascus, it will lose all the opportunities it has in the region. The state mind embodied in Devlet Bahçeli is trying to prevent, or at least balance, this madness.

The Kurds, with their nerves on edge, are aware of the situation. That's why they're acting calmly and patiently.

The Palace's judicial stick has been broken in the trustee operations; if they insist on using the broken stick, nothing will escalate except the dose of absurdity.

The Ankara Third Civil Court of First Instance's rejection of the case, relying on the Supreme Election Council's (YSK) decision, only demonstrated that the judiciary, as a stick of power, had reached its limits and was no longer useful.

Şişli Mayor Resul Emrah Şahan was imprisoned solely because of the City Agreement; no investigation was launched against him for corruption. When Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer was released on City Agreement charges, the path to Şahan's release was cleared. The prosecutor's office immediately took action, including Şahan in other municipal investigations and referring him to the Criminal Court of Peace with a request for his arrest . If you recall, Osman Kavala was also acquitted but was re-arrested in a new investigation. It's crystal clear that the prosecutor's primary motivation is not to conduct a lawful investigation, but to keep Şahan imprisoned. How can you claim that a rule of law exists in Turkey with these judicial machinations?

The delicate scales we call justice are under great strain, even the sword of Themis, the deity of justice, has been broken.

In all monarchies throughout history, the struggle for power begins before the king dies. Here, energetic individuals like Yavuz mobilize to seize power before the sultan even dies.

The war between factions within the Byzantine palace has escalated. Those who forced a rerun of the 2019 Istanbul election and targeted Rezzan Epözdemir and Can Holdin appear to be escalating the conflict. This spoiled group, who conduct politics with hammer, axe, and, when necessary, bulldozer, care nothing for the Palace's credibility and power they undermine. Therefore, you can expect them to throw the pile of stones they've accumulated at the foot of the political spectrum right into the thick of it.

On the other side, their rivals, whom they are trying to discredit and destroy, are waiting with the de facto power in their hands. Don't say, "It doesn't concern us." The real bombs haven't been dropped in this war yet. This rivalry could have devastating and power-altering effects, just as devastating as the Palace's unleashed war on the CHP.

The trustee appointments are being made to both the CHP and the capital behind this opposing faction within the Palace. Both use the judiciary as a stick. You should be careful that the Küçük Çekmece prosecutor's office steps up and that the gendarmerie, not the police, raids the heart of Istanbul.

Remember the story of the hammer and nails.

Since Özgür Özel has repeated the threat of civil disobedience, you might think that the CHP is preparing for the streets with passive resistance methods.

Considering the street protests that turned the government in Nepal into a well-behaved monkey and turned France upside down, it seems like a successful path, but it is not at all.

There are two ways to create the conditions for a state of emergency. The first is for Kurds to take to the streets following heated clashes between the Turkish Armed Forces and the SDF in Syria, as in the Kobani incidents. The second is for widespread protests spreading across Türkiye, such as the Gezi Park protests, to spiral out of control. Both can be used as justification for a state of emergency, provided minor provocations are present.

But it is not at all as expected.

The public is in dire straits. Economic bureaucrats emphasize that the tightening will continue. "Tightening" is the technical term for "austerity." "Austerity" means tightening belts to accommodate the emptiness in the stomachs of those losing weight through hunger.

The pressure accumulated in society is very high.

If street protests begin, the government won't be able to stop them, nor will the CHP or DEM control them. A panic similar to the one the government experienced at the beginning of Gezi could spell its end. Much blood will be shed, much suffering will occur. It won't benefit anyone; it will cost a fortune for its own sake. Everyone will lose.

What I'm doing is assuming the worst case scenario.

In the riverbed heading toward a power shift, space has narrowed and the flow has accelerated. Autumn has begun. The fruits have ripened. Wait patiently, and one by one, they will all fall into your lap.

We need sound minds, calmness and a lot of patience.