Islam Özkan wrote | The trap of sectarianism: Lessons from Lebanon to Türkiye

Following MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli's statement that one of the vice presidents could be Kurdish and the other Alevi, criticisms and assessments emerged that Türkiye was increasingly approaching the Lebanese model and facing the danger of Lebanonization. Criticisms such as the potential for this to deconstruct the unitary state, create serious damage, and prioritize sectarian divisions over meritocracy have completely shaped Türkiye's agenda.

If Bahçeli's proposal is implemented, is there a real risk of Türkiye becoming Lebanonized? Is this possible within Türkiye's current constitutional order? If not, would amending the constitution create a new imposition, potentially triggering ethnic and sectarian fault lines?

Above all, it's important to understand Bahçeli's words and what he means. We may not like his top-down approach, his political maneuvers, or his style of politics. His authoritarian political style may not be one we find appealing at all. In fact, we may not like his speaking style, his way of expressing himself, and his interpretation of facts. His statement, the subject of this article, may indeed have sectarian and ethnic implications. However, despite all this, it's necessary to clarify whether Bahçeli was actually referring to an institutional transformation, or whether he was referring to an unnamed, temporary situation that could be applied differently under any circumstances, or whether he was exchanging ideas at a brainstorming meeting. When read in context, I don't get the impression that he wasn't referring to the institutional implementation of the vice presidency. Regardless of Bahçeli's intentions, however, constructing a political system entirely based on sectarian and ethnic principles could indeed trigger some sensitive fault lines in the country and lead us to grapple with inextricable problems.

On the other hand, I cannot help but point out that an authoritarian politician is experiencing the consequences of being in a position to direct a democratic process like the peace process. The remark isn't antidemocratic; it might even appeal to those who believe in the rule of law and that minority rights are at least as respectable as the rights of the majority. But when these words come from the mouth of someone who has committed so many injustices and violations, and who disregards the dignity and autonomy of the judiciary, people inevitably look for something new. Furthermore, when the suspicion that the peace process was initiated because it enabled a constitutional amendment that would pave the way for the president's re-election, coupled with factors such as the process's lack of transparency, it's difficult for the opposition not to find the situation confusing.

Road accidents like these, statements that trigger action-reaction mechanisms, and gaffes will be common. In a climate of deepening authoritarianism, these are actually problems stemming from the implementation by anti-democratic actors of a process like the peace process, which would have created a powerful transformation toward a fully democratic and free structure.

However, the confessionalist system, in which state positions and appointments are subject to sectarian and ethnic classification, certainly seems unsuitable for Turkey's conditions, and designing the system based on these principles could lead to numerous drawbacks. However, the solution to this problem is not an approach that ignores ethnicities and sects. Whether Bahçeli says so or not, we face a system in Türkiye that attempts to standardize ethnic and sectarian/ethnic groups, has overlooked the advances made by democracy in recognizing differences, and has failed to seize the opportunity to transform minority rights based on law, justice, and freedom. If constitutional citizenship had been fully implemented by now, we would not be experiencing these problems. How can we address chronic problems with an approach that is blind to differences or sees the country's best interests in trivializing/leveling them out, and how long can we maintain the current structure? Therefore, demanding the continuation of the Republic concept, which was built a century ago and has sometimes failed to meet our needs, or trying to portray it as an ideal system is not a consistent approach and is at least as problematic as the sectarian/factional system.

It's also true that the sectarian/taifaist system implemented in Iraq and Lebanon is not, and cannot be, an alternative, particularly for Turkey; it will initiate a new process that will trigger problems that will plague the country in the future. Contrary to popular belief, this system was not implemented exclusively in these two countries. The Ottoman system was also a system with similar aspects, similar to the modern confessional/sectarian system. In fact, the current political system in Lebanon and Iraq reverting to a sectarian system approximately 20 years ago is closely related to the fact that it inherited both positive and negative elements from the Ottoman era, or was subject to a similar administrative system.

In 1943, colonial French rulers drafted a Christian-majority constitution in Damascus with the goal of creating a "Greater Lebanon," encompassing the Syrian territories they held influence over. They established this system to maintain European—especially French—commercial, political, and international influence, believing that a fragmented society would be more susceptible to intervention. The result was a structure described as "inter-denominational sectarianism," in which even religious groups within specific sects gained constitutional status.

In fact, the roots of civil wars lie in the accumulation of restrictions imposed during the colonial era and the government's prioritization of certain political and religious identities over others. However, while the French imposed a sectarian system on Lebanon as a necessary measure to rehabilitate old problems, they acted as if they were not the ones who initially created this problem.

Historically, Lebanon has been a mosaic of diverse religions and sects, including Maronites, Greek Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, Druze, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims. Since the French mandate of Lebanon granted independence in 1926, different sects have been granted different rights and powers within state institutions. For example, the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. This system ensured a shared power among the sects.

Unlike other Arab countries, Lebanon's constitution does not include an official state religion. Sectarianism is not limited to religion; it extends to political, legal, and cultural spheres. This is primarily due to Lebanon's diversity and weak national identity. While some sects share strong social solidarity, their commitment to the "nation-state" has not developed to the same extent.

Developments before and during the war also profoundly impacted this structure. The United Arab Republic, established in 1958 by the unification of Egypt and Syria, sparked a desire among Druze and Sunnis to join Arab nationalist causes. However, Christians and President Kamil Shamun opposed this, receiving support from American troops and maintaining the existing order. The roles played by foreign actors within this fragmented structure, along with the Israeli occupation, triggered conflict. While Sunnis and Druze supported the Palestinian resistance through the Lebanese branch of the PLO, Christians and Shiites opposed it.

These tensions ignited a civil war in 1975, when the Kata'ib Party, founded by Maronite Christians, attacked the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Kata'ib Party received arms support from the CIA in the 1970s. Despite rejecting Arab and Syrian influence, the party accepted the Syrian intervention in 1976. During the same period, other Christian militias, such as Tony Ifranci's Teyyar Militia, were also targeted. These developments demonstrate that the conflict was not solely religious or sectarian, but also characterized by political divisions within the sects.

Lebanese society is not only divided along sectarian lines; sects also have political divisions within them. For example, Sunnis are divided between Hariri's Future Party and the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Shiites have distinct political formations such as Hezbollah (pro-Iran) and Amal (pro-Syrian). This clearly demonstrates that the current situation is not solely one of sectarian divisions.

The sectarian/taifa system has created deep distrust among sectarian groups, fueling resource conflicts and racist violence. It has also made Lebanon vulnerable to external intervention—especially from Syria and Israel.

On the other hand, this system undermines social cohesion and weakens the state. A structure that protects only the interests of political elites has led to the exclusion of large segments of the population—especially young people and the poor. Unless reformed, Lebanon will inevitably remain in a perpetual cycle of chaos.

Confessionalism has paved the way for political deadlock and economic collapse in Lebanon. Each sect's veto power paralyzed decision-making and, along with the 2019 economic crisis, fueled widespread public discontent. The system has allowed external powers—Iran and Saudi Arabia—to be used as a tool for proxy wars. The civil war of 1975-1990 and the subsequent conflicts are clear evidence of the failure of Confessionalism.

"He who tries the tried and tested has no sense." This Arab proverb is borne out by the fact that countries implementing this system have never achieved stability, their state apparatus remains perpetually weak, and their focus is solely on protecting the rights of the elite. Numerous examples are available for those seeking a lesson.