Medyascope readers write | The meaning of elections in Türkiye is changing: The government's new opposition strategy

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In another article , I discussed why the regime in Turkey is becoming increasingly harsher and is approaching the limits of competitive authoritarianism. In that article, I argued that the opposition’s gaining power has increased the fear that “the system could collapse” and pushed the government to resort to harsher methods. The wave of operations has made this tendency more visible. Authoritarianism seems to be almost the only way for the government to maintain its power. As the cost of losing increases, it becomes impossible for the government to step back. Moreover, this cost is not only spread to the political power; it is also spread to the bureaucracy, capital and media actors who have become dependent on it, and thus the regime is being dragged into an increasingly closed and harsher structure.

This process also has a function of preventing potential cracks within the ruling bloc. It has been frequently discussed that İmamoğlu has started to exploit these cracks, especially through the relationships he has established with capital circles. It has even been claimed that he has created an image of a “future president” in these circles. İmamoğlu has therefore attracted a great deal of attention and reaction from the ruling party. His arrest was also a clear message to these circles: If you cross me, you will suffer the consequences.

Of course, maintaining the internal balance is very important for the government. However, the real goal is to make it impossible to change power through elections. It is obvious that the government's main aim with the judicial operations is to eliminate its strongest rival, İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu has been portraying a leader profile who has won every election he has participated in since the 2014 local elections by increasing his votes. In the most recent 2024 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality mayoral election, he defeated former Minister of Environment and Urbanization Murat Kurum by a margin of one million votes. Just a few days before he was announced as the CHP's presidential candidate, his university degree was revoked and he was arrested immediately afterwards. If İmamoğlu had not been a leader who could connect with voters from almost every segment of society, if he had not demonstrated a superior election performance, if he had not had a vision for governing the country and most importantly, if he had not been on the opposition ranks, he would not be in prison today. Moreover, it is not only İmamoğlu who has been arrested; the professional management team that worked with him and would run the presidential campaign has also been arrested. The aim of this move was to paralyze the capacity to run a campaign.

The government has been increasing its pressure on CHP municipalities for months. On the surface, these operations are presented as corruption investigations. However, the fact that no problems are being acted upon in other municipalities is a clear indication of the dual legal system in Türkiye. This structure, where the law has become a tool of pressure to punish the opposition, operates a completely different legal regime for those close to the government. This is where the weakest point of these cases lies. The public clearly sees the political purpose here. Therefore, reading these operations only under the title of combating corruption means not knowing Turkish politics in depth and turning a blind eye to authoritarianism.

The government is targeting not only İmamoğlu’s candidacy, but also the main opposition party, which has become the last bastion of democracy. The aim is to weaken the CHP with judicial interventions, bury the party in its own internal affairs, and thus prevent it from producing an alternative management program to the government. The CHP rose to the position of being the number one party in Türkiye after 47 years in the March 2024 local elections. It won 26 of the 39 districts in Istanbul and 35 of the 81 provinces in Turkey. Thus, it gained the authority to govern municipalities covering approximately 65 percent of Turkey’s population and approximately 80 percent of its economic size. It continues to be the number one party in Türkiye in all public opinion polls conducted since then.

Therefore, the aim is to absorb the energy of the CHP that emerged with the 2024 local elections, to drag the party into internal conflicts and, if possible, to divide it through lawsuits. Wearing down the party in the eyes of the voters and preventing it from appearing as a reliable governing alternative is also part of this strategy. The government is trying to control the legitimacy crisis opened by losing the election with such interventions.

The glorious days when it received more than 40 percent of the voter votes are long gone. It cannot achieve the voter support it once received on its own, even with its alliance partner. It has fallen behind the CHP in all public opinion polls. Therefore, the main goal is to weaken the CHP by breaking it up and to provide new support to the People's Alliance from right-wing parties. The AKP has made significant transfers from right-wing parties after 2023, and this trend is expected to continue. Moreover, in the upcoming period, the possibility of making new bargains with right-wing and Kurdish political actors through early elections, constitutional amendments and the "new solution process" is also on the table. In particular, the transformation of the presidential election into a single-round system is considered a critical way out for the sustainability of the regime. Such a change will provide a significant advantage to the government in a system where the candidate who receives the most votes will be elected, in any case where the opposition cannot put forward a united candidate.

Another and perhaps the most critical aim is to distract the agenda from the real problems of society and drown the CHP in its own internal issues and throne fights. Turkey is in a deep economic crisis. Wage earners are being crushed by inflation; problems are growing in almost every area from disaster management to agriculture, education to housing. Regional crises and wars are creating serious security risks. However, all of these have been off the agenda for a long time. Politics has been forced to talk about the CHP instead of the real problems of society for months. Thanks to the intense propaganda carried out by the government-controlled media, the CHP is being portrayed to the public as a disorganized party constantly struggling with its own internal problems.

Another strategic goal is to transform the CHP into an intra-system, controlled opposition party. The most serious obstacle to the authoritarian regime becoming hegemonic is the CHP, which is currently the strongest institutional opposition party. The party’s increasing vote share and its capacity to integrate with the social opposition have become one of the most fragile points of the current authoritarian structure. In order to become hegemonic and maintain their legitimacy, authoritarian regimes must keep a limited, controlled and controllable competitive environment alive. Competition is limited in a way that supports the legitimacy of the government but does not create a real alternative to the government. In Türkiye, this limitation is currently being attempted to be constructed directly through the CHP.

Erdoğan’s call to Özel to “take advantage of effective repentance” is a clear expression of this strategy. The expected role is clear: The CHP should provide a democratic showcase for the system, but it should be kept at a limit where it will not seek power and will not challenge the regime. The CHP is expected to be an actor that is oppositional enough to give the system an appearance of legitimacy, but controlled enough not to threaten the government. In this way, the CHP will continue to be accepted as a legitimate and legal political party, the blockade on it will be loosened, and it will not be prevented from winning a certain number of deputies and governing some metropolitan cities. However, it will be out of the question for it to demand a change of government.

In this context, the impression that the operations carried out after March 19 and the discussions of absolute nullity are being used as a bargaining tool is growing stronger. The message is being given to the CHP that the regime can offer a limited opposition space in return for it disregarding İmamoğlu and his team and supporting a possible constitutional amendment. Kılıçdaroğlu’s recent statements indicate that he may aspire to this role of opposition within the system and maintain this position. In order for the regime in Türkiye to maintain its legitimacy, creating a controlled opposition, just like in some authoritarian examples, has now become a central goal.

There are always unforeseen consequences in politics. It is now clear that the government did not foresee that the CHP would show such strong resistance after March 19. In fact, if this resistance had not been shown, worse scenarios could have probably occurred in terms of Turkish democracy. Judicial processes keep the party busy, but instead of sapping its energy, it brings it to the field more often, strengthens its connection with the voters and deepens the consolidation within the party. Similarly, I believe that the government underestimates the social opposition. Ankara is disconnected from the reality of society and cannot understand the field with old-fashioned acceptances. However, society is more ready for change than ever. Demands for justice, freedom and welfare are growing rapidly. The demand for a new story is rising in large segments. If we could go back from today, I think the government would not want to cancel the Istanbul elections in 2019. Because that election started İmamoğlu's story. A similar situation is happening today: İmamoğlu is growing as he remains the government's target. His being in prison further strengthens his support in the public and the emotional bond that has formed around him.

We are in a de facto regime change in Türkiye, and this process requires pushing the boundaries of the existing legal order to the extreme. This process is not progressing with a sudden rupture, but by eroding the boundaries of the existing legal order. Although this method provides the government with short-term room for maneuver, it creates serious uncertainty both in the system and within the ruling bloc in the long term. While the rules of the game are quickly redrawn in harsh regime changes, it is never fully predictable which rule will work against whom in which situation during this gradual transformation.

Uncertainty also causes discomfort in the ruling bloc

Therefore, it is never certain what results the steps taken will lead to tomorrow, or even how these results may return to power itself. This uncertainty also creates discomfort within the ruling bloc. Some lawyers within the AKP have drawn attention to the dangers that the absolute nullity debate may create. Paving the way for the annulment of the Supreme Election Board decisions through the courts does not only target the current opposition; once this path is opened, it can paralyze the functioning of the entire political system and even render past elections controversial. The concern that this legal impasse may return in the future and also hit the actors within the ruling bloc is being expressed openly, if not loudly, within ruling circles.

Therefore, the possibility that these lawsuits, which are initiated with the aim of closing ranks and suffocating the opposition, will have the opposite effect should not be ignored. These steps taken with the aim of consolidating the regime may create new cracks within the ruling bloc and make the current balance even more fragile. Every step taken not only increases the engineering efforts of the government, but also the society’s demand for change and the opposition’s resistance. Politics in Türkiye is no longer a script written solely by the government. How this story will end will be decided not only by the government, but also by the opposition and society.

Who is Mustafa Bolukbasi?

He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Uşak University (Rectorate). His research focuses on political parties, the fragmentation of the party system, right-wing politics and election campaigns, with a particular focus on comparative developments in Turkish politics and Southern Europe. He has published articles in internationally refereed journals, and his recent work focuses on the fragmentation of the right and the dynamics of electoral competition under competitive authoritarian regimes.